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LAW AND TRANSNATIONAL
CORRUPTION: THE NEED FOR
LINCOLN’S LAW ABROAD
PAUL D. CARRINGTON*
I
INTRODUCTION
The endemic corruption of weak governments in poor nations is a major
impediment to the development of world trade beneficial to both those who
work for a living and those who manage them. Public corruption, like private
greed, is a problem everywhere. It was an identifying mark of the Roman
Empire1 and of many and perhaps most colonial regimes from their beginnings
through the twentieth century.2 As Judith Shklar has explained, wherever there
is a self-serving elite, there is a need to “guard the guardians” against this form
of original sin.3 Benjamin Franklin wisely observed, “[t]here is no kind of
dishonesty into which otherwise good people more easily and frequently fall,
than that of defrauding the government.”4 This is so in part because the line of
moral conduct in public service is not always clearly drawn. The faint line
between a campaign contribution and a bribe is an example of the lack of
clarity.5 Family interests, longstanding friendships, and political alliances supply
others. But such complexities do not cloud the simple problem of plain bribery
of public officers by the private firms with whom they deal.
Corruption is an especially difficult problem in poor nations endowed with
natural resources highly valued by people in wealthier nations.6 We are told by
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1. CULLEN MURPHY, ARE WE ROME? THE FALL OF AN EMPIRE AND THE FATE OF AMERICA
passim (2007).
2. See, e.g., NICHOLAS B. DIRKS, THE SCANDAL OF EMPIRE: INDIA AND THE CREATION OF
IMPERIAL BRITAIN (2006).
3. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 243–44 (1984).
4. See RICHARD JACKSON, HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT
OF PENNSYLVANIA (1759); Benjamin Franklin, “F.B.”: On Smuggling, LONDON CHRON., Nov. 21–24,
1767 (draft), available at http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp (last visited Mar. 24,
2007).
5. See ANDREW STARK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 152–77 (2000).
6. JOSEPH STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK: THE NEXT STEPS TO GLOBAL PEACE
158–59 (2006); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 59–71 (1968).
See generally LESLIE HOLMES, ROTTEN STATES: CORRUPTION, POST-COMMUNISM AND
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the World Bank that bribes totaling a trillion dollars were paid in 2002.7 The
larger share of that amount was undoubtedly paid by firms that extract and
export natural resources for sale in the developed world. A timely example of
the evil is provided by the “biggest heist in modern history,”8 the United
Nations’ Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq. Major corporate enterprises around the
planet shared in illicit benefits from, and in responsibility for, schemes leaving
the population of Iraq undernourished despite the many billions of dollars
theoretically deployed to feed them. Few of the many offenders have been
punished for participating in that heist.9 The governments of most oil-producing
nations are squalid with bribery; Nigeria and Kazakhstan serve as additional
premier examples of nations in which the national wealth has been
appropriated for the personal benefit of a few officials and the foreign firms
with which they deal.10
Prevention or deterrence of corruption by law, where substantially achieved,
requires cultural traditions of mutual respect sufficient to animate the
professional independence of judges and other civil servants responsible for law
enforcement,11 and an investment of public resources sufficient to maintain legal
institutions with the requisite measure of independence. Poor nations often lack
both the resources and the traditions. Their judiciaries might be likened, as an
old metaphor has it, to low-wage waiters in elegant hotels who were absolutely
forbidden to take tips.12 Underenforcement of law is therefore chronic and often
grave in such nations.13 Unless somehow corrected, the result is a “failing” and
then a “failed” state:

NEOLIBERALISM (2006); INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION (Susan
Rose Ackerman ed., 2006). But a nation need not have vast natural resources to have a problem with
the corruption of underpaid judges. See, e.g., JENNIFER A. WIDNER, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW
273–90 (2001).
7. Susan Rose Ackerman, Governance and Corruption, in GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS
301 (Bjorn Lornberg ed., 2004).
8. Syria and the United Nations Oil-For-Food Program: Joint Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations and the H. Subcomm. on the Middle East and Central Asia of the Comm.
on Int’l Relations, 109th Cong. 15 (2005) (statement of Rep. Ros-Lehtinen, Chair, H. Comm. on the
Middle East and Central Asia), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/
hfa22654.000/hfa22654_0f.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
9. E.g., Texas oil man Oscar Wyatt was indicted in 2005 and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
commit the federal crime of wire fraud in 2007; Steve Gelsi, Oscar Wyatt Pleads Guilty in Oil-for-Food
Scandal, MARKETWATCH, Oct. 1, 2007. Also, Ingersoll-Rand has agreed to pay a $2.5 million fine.
Press Release, United Press International, Ingersoll Rand Fined in Oil-for-Food Probe (Oct. 31, 2007).
See also Australians Who Bribe, ECONOMIST, Dec. 2, 2006, at 46; Julia Preston, Former Chief of U.N.
Effort Faces Charges Of Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2007, at A1.
10. Ron Stodghill, Oil, Cash and Corruption: How Influence Flowed Through Political Pipelines,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2006, SUNDAY BUSINESS at 1.
11. On the indispensability of trust, see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA: TRUST, SOCIAL VIRTUES, AND THE
CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995).
12. To be distinguished are tips paid to low-level public employees. Such “grease” may be
indispensable to functioning of public institutions in some impoverished lands. J. S. Nye, Corruption
and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 420 (1967).
13. See, e.g., Okechukwu Oko, Seeking Justice in Transnational Societies: An Analysis of the
Problems and Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 25 (2006).
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Corruption is fundamental to failed states. Not only does it flourish in failed states,
but in them it thrives on an unusually destructive scale. Widespread petty or
lubricating corruption exists as a matter of course, but failed states are noted for rising
levels of venal corruption: kickbacks on anything that can be put out to fake tender or
bid (medical supplies, textbooks, constructions, roads, railways, tourism concessions,
new airports, and so on); unnecessarily wasteful construction projects arranged so as
to maximize the rents that they are capable of generating; licenses for existing or
imaginary enterprises and activities; and a persistent and generalized extortion.
Moreover, corrupt ruling elites invest their profits overseas, not at home, thus
14
contributing yet further to the economic attrition of their own states.

Unless and until means can be devised to deter bribery in impecunious
nations, globalization can be of scant benefit to most of the people of those
nations, for they are destined to be governed weakly, if at all, and to serve as
havens here or there for all sorts of gangsters and terrorists. One need not be a
humanitarian to take the transnational corruption problem seriously.
This essay responds to that concern. It considers some possible reforms of
international law that might serve to deter the corruption of weak governments.
All its suggestions entail the use of the American practice of private
enforcement of public law, a system that minimizes dependence on public
officials who are subject to capture by wealthy outsiders.15 Privatized law
enforcement in the American tradition generally threatens legal consequences
on harmful practices ex post rather than preventing harmful practices ex ante. It
offers the advantage to Business of greater freedom in the conduct of
transactions. But its many costs result in resistance by many businessmen in the
United States against whom law is often privately enforced and by wise lawyers
of other lands blessed with public institutions that can be and are trusted to
enforce public law.16
The relevance of the American practice of privatized law enforcement to
the corruption problem results from the historical fact that it is a product of a
nineteenth-century culture sharing very limited trust in government and its
officers. Its cultural situation thus bears some resemblance to the situations
both in impoverished lands and in the community of nations hoping for
enforcement of international law prohibiting corrupt practices. It is a system of
law enforcement that reduces the law’s dependence on the integrity of judges,

14. Robert I. Rotberg, The Challenge of Weak, Failing, and Collapsed States, in LEASHING THE
DOGS OF WAR 87 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 2007).
15. Similar ideas for protecting against corruption by public officials are advanced in Ethan S.
Berger & Mary S. Holland, Why the Private Sector is Likely to Lead the Next Stage in the Global Fight
Against Corruption, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 45, 69–74 (2006). See also Christopher Hodges,
Europeanization of Civil Justice: Trends and Issues, 26 CIVIL JUSTICE Q. 96 (2007).
16. I have in recent years been on a campaign to elevate transnational awareness of this
fundamental difference. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The American Tradition of Private Law
Enforcement, in BITBURGER GESPRÄCHE JAHRBUCH 33 (2003) (on file with author); Paul D.
Carrington, Foreign Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts: Private Enforcement of Public Law, 9 WASEDA BULL. OF
COMP. L. 149 (2007) (on file with author).
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prosecutors, and other public servants. Wherever public integrity is in great
doubt, the American experience may offer useful instruction.17
II
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Recognition in the United States of the problem of transnational corruption
dates from the Cold War. American firms had long been accustomed to bribing
officials of foreign governments in violation of their laws in order to secure
profitable public contracts. It was fair to assume that such payments were
sometimes indispensable conditions of foreign trade because contracts were
often going to the highest bidder, that is, the most generous briber.18 Although
bribes paid in violation of state or federal laws were not treated as business
expenses deductible from income for tax purposes (and so were paid with aftertax dollars), bribes paid to foreign officials were deductible, regardless of their
illegality under foreign law (and thus in a sense subsidized by the United States
government).19
Securities-regulation laws enacted in the 1930s did impose public-law
standards on accounting practices of corporations whose shares are sold
publicly.20 Even foreign firms listing securities on American exchanges were
required to file accurate financial information to be made available to investors.
Problems arose in accounting for foreign bribes paid by firms so listed. Must
such payments be revealed to investors? If so, recipients and informers were
put at risk. Compliance was imperfect.
The Watergate scandal and the misuse of corporate money to fund
President Nixon’s 1972 presidential campaign led to an investigation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of reported expenses that might
have been payments made for the purpose of gaining illicit advantage with
government officials. The investigation revealed widespread use of false
accounting methods to conceal bribes paid to foreign officials.21 The SEC
initiated the practice of investigating such reporting and seeking injunctions to
compel companies to make full disclosures in the financial statements
distributed to investors.22 It also initiated a voluntary disclosure program that
led to the revelation that more than 450 companies had concealed at least $400
million in bribes paid to foreign officials. Among the scandals revealed was the
17. For another proposal bearing some resemblance to the one advanced here, see CIVIL
LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM (John Norton Moore ed., 2004) (suggesting that the civil justice
system may be able to play a role in the war against terrorism).
18. For reflection on the problem, see W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY,
CRUSADES, AND REFORMS 161–73 (1979).
19. Internal Revenue Code 26 U.S.C. § 162(c)(1) (2000).
20. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2000)).
21. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE SEC ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL
CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND
URBAN AFFAIRS (May 1976).
22. E.g., SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 829–30 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
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payment of a million dollars by The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to Prince
Bernhard of the Netherlands to secure a sale of military aircraft.23
The political reaction to these scandals was led by Senator William
Proxmire of Wisconsin.24 He observed that the revelation diminished the moral
stature of the United Sates in the competition of the Cold War by “eroding
public confidence in our institutions.”25 He proposed to make more explicit the
SEC responsibility for disclosure. Thus, the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) enacted in 1977 required transparent accounting by
any issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 78l of this title or
which is required to file reports under section 780(d) of this title, or for any officer,
director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf
of such issuer, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
26
commerce . . . .

It was also noticed that the SEC had authority only over firms filing public
accounting statements, and not over those American firms that were privately
owned. Accordingly, a criminal law to be enforced by the Department of Justice
was deemed essential, and was also enacted.27 It was adopted by a unanimous
vote in both Houses of Congress and signed by President Carter in 1977.28
Thus, while the SEC retained authority to seek injunctions against
accounting practices that concealed such payments, the task was assigned to the
Department of Justice to prosecute serious offenders. It was expected that these
two institutions would collaborate in enforcement of the law. Firms in which
Americans were likely to invest were made subject to punishment for
concealing illegal payments or offers of payment to officers of foreign
governments as well as those paid in the United States.
As other investment markets have grown in Europe and Asia, global firms
have relied more frequently on investors in markets outside the United States.
Some firms in the United States have come to avoid accounting regulation by
trading their investments privately through investment vehicles such as hedge
funds.29 These developments diminish the effectiveness of the SEC and its
disclosure requirements as instruments to deter the bribery of foreign officials.
And this trend may be growing in response to the elevated standards imposed

23. Obituary: Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, BBC NEWS, Dec. 2, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/749465.stm (last visited Mar. 8, 2007).
24. Pat Towell & Barry M. Hagen, Foreign Bribes: Stiff Penalties Proposed, 35 CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP. 929 (May 14, 1977).
25. Id.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2000).
27. For a chronicle of the legislative history, see DONALD R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: A GUIDE FOR U.S. FIRMS DOING BUSINESS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE 1–12 (2d ed. 1999).
28. 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. (91 Stat.) 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2000)).
29. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from
Securities Market Failure (Columbia Law Sch., Center for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No.
158, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=190568.
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by the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms of 2002,30 which have led numerous firms to
withdraw from the American investment market. Firms departing from the
public investment market in the United States thereby escape disclosure
requirements and therefore have less cause for concern about the possible
enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
The criminal-law provisions of the FCPA to be enforced by the Department
of Justice also prohibit “corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, [any]
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift,
promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value” directly or
indirectly to a foreign official for the purpose of influencing an official decision
with respect to securing or retaining business.31 These prohibitions were
applicable to all American domestic concerns whether or not they were
registered on a stock exchange, so long as any part of the transaction occurred
in the United States (or in its territorial waters), in interstate commerce, or by
use of the mails. Regulated firms are generally responsible for the corrupt
conduct of their employees.32 But the prohibitions did not apply to citizens of
foreign nations acting on behalf of foreign subsidiaries of American firms if the
citizens’ conduct occurred outside the United States.33
The FCPA was written only as public law to be enforced by the SEC and as
criminal law to be enforced by the Department of Justice; no provision was
made for enforcement in civil actions brought by private plaintiffs.34 But a
violation of the Act resulting in harm to competing firms exposes the offender
to civil liability under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO).35 And bribery is also a violation of state tort law if it causes foreseeable
harm to a business competitor or others.36 As Judge Richard Posner opined:
“[B]ribery is a deliberate tort, and one way to deter it is to make it worthless to
the tortfeasor by stripping away all his gain.”37 Indeed, it is the sort of deliberate
tort that may expose the wrongdoer to liability for punitive damages.
Of course, plaintiffs in civil actions in state or federal courts may be
represented by lawyers who have agreed to charge fees contingent on success,
and under the “American Rule” they are at little risk of liability for the

30. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); see generally AFTER
ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNIZING SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE
AND THE US (John Armour & Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2006).
31. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1998). See generally STUART DEMING,
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL NORMS 7–20 (2005).
32. To some it seems unjust that innocent shareholders should bear a resulting loss caused by the
criminal misconduct of their employees. John C. Coffee, Jr., No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick: An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981).
33. DEMING, supra note 31, at 8.
34. See generally Lamb v. Phillip Morris Inc., 915 F. 2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kay,
359 F. 3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004).
35. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Techtronics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990). Cf. Kensington Int’l
Ltd. v. Société Nat. des Pétroles du Congo, No. 05 Civ. 5101, 2006 WL 846351 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2006).
36. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal.4th 1134, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29 (2003).
37. Williams Elec. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 366 F. 3d 569 (7th Cir. 2004).
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defendants’ fees if they lose their cases. There are therefore few disincentives
for plaintiffs having reason to believe that they have been victims of corrupt
decisions to file suit. And in the United States, plaintiffs also have recourse to
rules of civil procedure that facilitate private investigation of facts in dispute.38
That recourse is comparable to that available to civil servants conducting
governmental investigations. That an official act of a foreign sovereign may be
called into question is not an impediment to such civil enforcement.39
Also, if the occasion requires, in the United States multiple plaintiffs may
aggregate their claims to present them more efficiently and effectively. And if
plaintiffs or defendants are apprehensive about the political sensitivities of the
judiciary, they may demand trial by jury, an institution that is virtually
invulnerable to bribery or intimidation.
All these familiar provisions of American law enable private plaintiffs to
serve as the primary enforcers of many laws enacted to serve such public aims
as those served by the FCPA. Not least among the national laws privately
enforced are the securities laws prohibiting fraud.40 So far, though, private
claims in American courts for damages resulting from foreign corruption are
few. Yet the Act’s criminal-law provisions are reinforced by the prospect of civil
liability, and that prospect may add materially to its deterrent effect.
As the FCPA was enacted, the United States Internal Revenue Code was
revised to prohibit income-tax deductions for bribes paid in violation of foreign
law. 41 No longer would the federal government bear part of the cost of foreign
corrupt practices.
The International Chamber of Commerce gave a salute to American FCPA
law when a year later it promulgated its Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion
and Bribery. These were “ineffective as a practical matter,”42 but expressed the
policy of the FCPA.
Because the FCPA was unique to the United States, it was a continuing
source of unrest among American businessmen whose ability to compete in
many markets was threatened by a reluctance to engage in corruption. It was
alleged that contracts with foreign governments worth billions of dollars were
not made because of the inability of American firms to match the bribes offered
by their foreign competitors. Given the ease with which the law could be
evaded by the use of employees of foreign corporate subsidiaries trained to
conceal their corrupt practices from top management, claims of enormous

38. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a) (permitting parties to take depositions).
39. E.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., supra note 35.
40. See generally THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION (5th ed. 2006).
41. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (c)(1) (1998): “No deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any
payment made, directly or indirectly, to an official or employee of any government, or of any agency or
instrumentality of any government, if the payment constitutes an illegal bribe or kickback or, if the
payment is to an official or employee of a foreign government, the payment is unlawful under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.”
42. CRUVER, supra note 27, at 81.
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economic loss must be received with caution. But some lost deals could well
have been substantial ones.43
Although the FCPA was enforced by both the SEC and the Department of
Justice, the number of enforcement prosecutions was never large, and most of
the cases brought were privately settled with guilty pleas.44 There are, however,
a few notable exceptions. For example, a case brought against ten defendants
accused of bribing officials of the Mexican national oil company went to trial;
all were convicted.45 Another highly publicized case was brought against
General Electric in 1992 for its corrupt relationship with an Israeli general; the
company pleaded guilty to four federal offenses and paid $69 million in fines.
General Electric was also convicted of violating the Money Laundering Control
Act.46 Another striking example was the civil suit filed by the SEC in 1996
against an Italian firm listed on the New York Stock Exchange and accused of
concealing millions of dollars in bribes paid to Italian politicians; it was enjoined
from accounting practices concealing the corruption.47
The FCPA was first amended in 1988.48 The 1977 Act had threatened
punishment for American firms with “reason to know”49 that their money was
finding its way into an unworthy pocket. Businessmen found this phrase
daunting, and Congress responded to the concern by reducing the phrase to
“punish only those aware that the [corrupt] result is substantially certain to
occur.”50 In one of the later reported criminal cases, it was found that officers of
an accused firm should have known that a bribe was being paid.51 Liability
under the amended Act may arise if the firm authorizes the misdeed explicitly
or implicitly or merely acquiesces. The bribe may take the modest form of an
airline ticket.52 Liability is to be imposed even if the misdeed is performed by a
foreign partner or an affiliated firm. One may be guilty of a conspiracy to
corrupt a foreign official. No one person within a firm need have all the
requisite information enabling the employee to assess the likelihood that a
bribe is being paid.53 In these latter respects, the 1988 amendments strengthened

43. For an assessment of the consequences, see JVOTI N. PRASAD, IMPACT OF THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977 ON U.S. EXPORT (1993) (presenting and analyzing data on the
impact of anticorruption measures on U.S. trade).
44. See DEMING, supra note 31, at 6.
45. See generally United States v. Crawford Enter., Inc. 645 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Tex. 1986). For an
account of the extensive practice of bribery in Mexico in the 1980s, see ALAN RIDING, DISTANT
NEIGHBORS: A PORTRAIT OF THE MEXICANS 112–33 (1989) (describing the necessity of corruption in
the Mexican political system).
46. See generally United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 808 F. Supp. 580 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
47. CRUVER, supra note 27, at 67.
48. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–418, § 5003, 102 Stat.
1415 (1988).
49. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
50. 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(i) (1998).
51. United States v. King, 321 F. 3d 859 (8th Cir. 2003).
52. E.g., United States v. Liebo, 923 F. 2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991).
53. See generally United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F. 2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).
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the criminal law intended to deter corruption of foreign governments. But it
does not appear to have resulted in numerous prosecutions and convictions in a
world amply supplied with offenders.
III
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
The FCPA was amended again in 1998 as the International Anti-Bribery
and Fair Competition Act54 in order to bring American law into line with the
new international Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions.
One change of substance made in the 1998 amendment was to legitimate
“grease,” that is, small rewards or tips to lower-ranking officers “to expedite or
to secure the performance of a routine governmental action . . . .”55 At the
lower levels, “grease” may be indispensable to the operation of some
impoverished governments.56 Another change was to extend the law to forbid
payments to officials of “public international organizations.”57 And foreign
nationals working for American firms were brought within the group subject to
criminal liability for illicit payments or officers. But those working for foreign
subsidiaries were still not included.
The 1997 Convention to which these changes respond is part of an
international movement. Much energy and rhetoric is now being expended
around the globe in a campaign to deter transnational corrupt practices. The
campaign can be seen and heard in such august venues as the World Bank, the
International Chamber of Commerce, and highly respected nongovernmental
organizations such as Transparency International.
The present campaign had its origins in the Asian financial crisis of the
1990s. That event elevated interest in international regulation of trade to
provide greater stability in developing economies. And the United States was
especially interested in regulating transnational bribery in order to level the
playing field for American firms subject to the FCPA. As a result, the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (a group
supported by the United States and by the International Chamber of
Commerce) promulgated requirements for signatories to the new Convention.
That Convention obligates signatory nations to enact criminal laws
“functionally equivalent” to those prescribed and to cooperate with the
54. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat.
3302 (1998). On the state of the law at that time, see Symposium—A Review of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act on its Twentieth Anniversary: Its Application, Defense and International Aftermath, 18 NW.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 263 (1998); Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229 (1997).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (1998). See also The Etiquette of Bribery: How to Grease a Palm,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 2006, at 115 (noting that tactful strategies are used to ensure that bribes go
undetected).
56. Nye, supra note 12, at 102.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1) (1998).
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enforcement efforts of other signatory nations.58 In support of the latter
obligation, a system of private peer review was established by OECD; the
organization subjects signatory nations to periodic reviews by teams of
specialists from at least two other states.59 There is, however, a substantive
difference between the Convention and the FCPA in that the former does not
forbid campaign contributions to foreign candidates, as the FCPA does. And
the Convention does not obligate signatory nations to enact accounting and
record-keeping standards corresponding to those enforced in the United States
by the SEC.
As of 2007, thirty-six nations have ratified this OECD Convention, including
most of the major players in international commerce.60 Also in 1997, the
Organization of American States promulgated the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption;61 it is even more explicit in requiring enactment of specified
criminal laws. In 2002, the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption entered into force, with forty-six signatories.62 In 2003, the African
Union opened for signature its similar convention.63
In 1999, the Council of Europe adopted the Civil Law Convention on
Corruption. Its aim, as stated by the Council, is to take “into account the need
to fight corruption and in particular provide for effective remedies for those
whose rights and interests are affected by corruption.”64 Its signers are obliged
to authorize civil actions for compensation of firms damaged by corrupt
practices.65 This Convention entered into force in 2003.
And in 2003, the United Nations opened its Convention Against
Corruption66—negotiated by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime—in Vienna; it

58. OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. 105-43, art. 1.1 (1998). For a brief account, see
Lucinda A. Low & William M. McGlone, Avoiding Problems Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
U.S. Antiboycott Laws, OFAC Sanctions, Export Controls, and the Economic Espionage Act, in
NEGOTIATING AND STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 200–03 (Mark R.
Sandstrom & David N. Goldsweig eds., 2003).
59. Peer review is said to be “at the very heart of OECD.” See, e.g., FABRIZIO PAGANI, PEER
REVIEW: A TOOL FOR CO-OPERATION AND CHANGE—AN ANALYSIS OF AN OECD WORKING
METHOD (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.oecd.org (search document title for .pdf) (last visited
Oct. 29, 2007).
60. Public Procurement: Spotting the Bribe, OECD OBSERVER (Apr. 2007), available at
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/2170/Public_procurement:_Spotting_the_bribe.htm
(last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
61. DEMING, supra note 31, at 101–04.
62. Id. at 105.
63. See African Union Convention on Combating Corruption, 11 July 2003, available at
http://www.africaunion.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/Convention
%20on%20Combating%20Corruption.pdf.
64. Council of Europe, Civil Law Convention on Corruption ch. 1, art. 3, Nov. 4, 1999, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/174.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2007)
65. Council of Europe, Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Explanatory Report art. 1(a)(6)
(1999), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/174.htm.
66. See U.N. Convention Against Corruption, 31 Oct. 2003, available at http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/crime_convention_corruption.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
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will come into force when ratified by thirty countries. That seems not to have
happened yet. Its general tone is reflected in Article 17:
Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may
be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the
abuse of functions or position, that is, the performance of or failure to perform an act,
in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the
purpose of obtaining an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person
or entity.

A similarly tentative tone is expressed in suggestions that each State Party take
action to proscribe deliberate concealment of bribes67 or obstruction of justice,68
and provide for civil liability “if necessary.”69 It has been said that this U.N.
Convention is to be a “focal point” of the United States’ campaign against
corruption.70
One may admire all the efforts of those who have secured the promulgation
and ratification of these international conventions, and yet question whether
they are effective in serving their stated purpose. There is not yet an empirical
study of their effect on the practices of the officials of weak governments: if all
the nations ratifying one or more of these conventions have enacted criminal
laws forbidding their nationals to corrupt weak foreign governments, so what?
Are public prosecutors in these nations likely to prosecute their fellow nationals
or local firms that employ many of their fellow nationals? For paying a bribe to
a foreign official in order to secure a contract or other benefit that will
indirectly serve the interests of their fellow nationals? How much effort can
prosecutors reasonably be expected to expend investigating possible violations
of such criminal laws? How much money will impoverished parliaments and
legislatures facing competing demands on public resources appropriate to fund
such investigations and prosecutions? Can the system of peer review established
by the OECD assure adequate answers to these questions?
In 2006, the United States undertook to reinforce these efforts of foreign
governments to enforce these laws. It repeated its promise made in 2004 to deny
entry into the United States for any person guilty of corrupting a foreign
government. It also announced that “[t]he U.S. will also work bilaterally and
multilaterally to immobilize kleptocratic foreign public officials using financial
and economic sanctions against them and their network of cronies.”71 And it
promised to enlarge its efforts to seize assets acquired by corrupt practices.
But the weakness of the global resolve to punish foreign corrupt practices by
means of criminal law, which is enforced by public servants, was recently and
67. Id. at art. 24.
68. Id. at art. 25.
69. Id. at art. 26.
70. Press Release, Dep’t of State Bureau for Int’l Narcotics & Crime Control, Press Release, U.S.
Contributes $500,000 to Support Implementation of the United Nation Convention Against Corruption
(Dec. 14, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/other/39714.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
71. Fact Sheet, White House, National Strategy to Internationalize Efforts Against Kleptocracy
(Aug. 10, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060810-1.html (last
visited Nov. 11, 2007).
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fully revealed by the British government. In 2001, the United Kingdom enacted
a criminal law as required by the OECD Convention. In 2004, its Serious Fraud
Office initiated an inquiry into bribes allegedly paid by a British weapons firm
to secure contracts with the government of Saudi Arabia. In November 2006, it
was reported that Saudi Arabia would break diplomatic relations with the
United Kingdom if the investigation were not dropped.72 In December 2006, the
investigation was dropped. Prime Minister Blair justified the action by calling
attention to the dual needs of securing the help of Saudi Arabia in dealing with
Palestinian affairs and securing thousands of jobs for workers hired to perform
the corrupt contract,73 considerations said to overbalance the rule of law.
Perhaps Mr. Blair’s successor will pursue a different course.74
But such cases are also sometimes difficult for the United States. A pending
case illustrates both the problem and the difficulty of its solution. James Giffen,
an American citizen, was indicted in 2005 for bribing President Nursultan
Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan on behalf of Mobil, Texaco, Phillips–Conoco, and
BP. His alleged offense gained public attention in 2000. After four years of
investigation, Giffen was charged with thirteen counts of violating the FCPA
and thirty–three counts of money laundering.75 It was alleged that fees paid by
the oil companies were used by Giffen to purchase an array of luxury items,
including millions of dollars in jewelry; fur coats for President Nazarbaev’s wife,
Sara, and a daughter, costing nearly $30,000; $45,000 for tuition at an exclusive
Swiss high school; and tuition at George Washington University in the U.S.
capital for Nazarbaev’s daughter, Aliya. Giffen also allegedly bought an $80,000
Donzi speedboat for one Balgimbaev to present to Nazarbaev, and two
American snowmobiles for Nazarbaev and his wife. Giffen has claimed to have
been acting as a CIA agent or perhaps a mere “bag man” for the president.
President Nazarbaev, who is a friend of American foreign policy in the Middle
East, is severely critical of the prosecution and might lose his office as a result of
it. Government witnesses have received death threats. The trial has been
repeatedly postponed but will perhaps be held in 2007.
Given many such experiences, a skeptic may doubt that these enactments
pose a truly serious threat of punishment to the many firms around the world
whose profits seem to depend on their willingness to participate in the
corruption of foreign governments. Of course, such laws imply a moral
judgment, and businessmen are not immune to moral suasion. But as Adam

72. David Leppard, Blair Hit By Saudi ‘Bribery’ Threat, SUN. TIMES (LONDON), Nov. 19, 2006, at
1.
73. Barefaced, ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 2006, at 18.
74. See Todd Swanson, Note, Greasing the Wheels: British Deficiencies in Relation to American
Clarity in International Anti-Corruption Law, 35 GA. J. INTL. & COMP L. 397, 431 (2007).
75. Marlena Telvick, Kazakhstan: United States v. James H. Giffen, http://kazhegeldin.addr.com/
2004en/engl_03_06_04.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2007). The indictment also revealed that Swiss
authorities began investigating accounts “nominally owned by offshore companies but beneficially
owned, directly or indirectly, by Balgimbaev and Nazarbaev . . . into which Mr. Giffen had made tens of
millions of dollars in unlawful payments” in 1999. Id.
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Smith observed, moral constraints lose force as they are applied over greater
distances.76 Benjamin Franklin’s dictum77 applies with even greater force when
the government being corrupted is not one’s own. Corrupt practices are by
definition secret crimes that can be prevented or deterred only by vigorous
investigation and forceful legal sanctions.
With its new Civil Law Convention, the Council of Europe acknowledged
the need for an enforcement mechanism imposing real, adverse economic
consequences on firms that bribe foreign governments. And there appears to be
rising concern in Germany that German firms have elevated profits by illicit
methods: “[g]lobalization has become a motor for corruption in Germany.”78
Civil liability is surely the primary legal sanction deterring firms from bribing
one another’s employees in the private sector, and it is the integrity of
governments that is the global problem most in need of a plausible threat of
civil liability.
The Civil Law Convention is a step forward, but there is as yet no report of
civil actions against offenders. It brings the Council of Europe into line with the
law of the United States, as manifested by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and the case law recognizing bribery of foreign officials by American firms as a
tort remediable under RICO or the common law of American states.79 But
unlike the FCPA, it does not appear to provide a forum for foreign
governments seeking compensation from defendants who are equally foreign to
the nations of the Council whose courts may exercise jurisdiction.
There is also the very substantial problem that many of the European courts
opened to claims seeking compensation for harms resulting from corrupt
practices are generally less hospitable to plaintiffs bringing civil cases. Few if
any adhere to the “American rule” that a losing plaintiff is not liable for the
defendant’s expenses, including attorneys’ fees. Although there are variations
on laws governing attorneys’ fees, European plaintiffs in cases arising under the
Civil Law Convention would not likely be permitted to retain counsel for a fee
contingent upon his or her success in the case. And although European courts
often conduct penetrating factual inquiries, private plaintiffs enforcing public
law in most of the member nations are rarely empowered to conduct private
investigations of the sort permitted by the discovery rules used in American
courts. It is also questionable whether a plaintiff would have access to
government records of the sort opened to plaintiffs by “Freedom of
Information” or state “sunshine” legislation in the United States. Seldom if ever
would plaintiffs in European courts be permitted to aggregate their claims to
make their assertion more economic. And few European courts are empowered
to issue injunctions enforceable by imprisonment. On account of these

76. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 136 (Oxford U. Press 1976).
77. See Franklin, supra note 4.
78. So we are told by a German prosecutor. Carter Dougherty, Germany Battling Rising Tide of
Corporate Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, at C1.
79. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994).
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differences in civil procedure, the European courts are unlikely to make the
Civil Law Convention a threat sufficiently serious to deter European firms
motivated by the marketplace to engage in corrupt practices, except for blatant
misdeeds.
One might therefore reasonably assess the enactments of the United States
and the other nations since 1998 conforming to all these conventions as a benign
but largely inconsequential gesture. If an act of corruption should attract
substantial public notice, the signatory nations have empowered themselves to
stand on the side of integrity in government by conducting a criminal
prosecution. The United States is no longer alone in taking that moral stand.
And perhaps its enactments will serve to enlarge the force of moral suasion
against corrupt practices. But the threat of punishment, even in the United
States, is remote and evadable. And the threat of civil liability for resulting
harm is no less remote, at least outside the United States.
IV
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACTS: QUI TAM
The United States has had ample experience of its own with the problem of
corrupt government,80 and has long sought to deter it by law privately enforced
by citizens rewarded for their efforts.
Corruption was rampant during the American war for independence; for
example, Samuel Chase (later Mr. Justice Chase of the United States Supreme
Court), was dismissed from the Continental Congress for his illicit use of inside
information to turn a personal profit.81 Because of such experiences of the
wartime government, the first Congress of the United States enacted legislation
based on an ancient English practice identified by the Latin phrase qui tam,
describing actions brought on behalf of the Crown by one of its subjects.82 This
law authorized private citizens to represent the United States in claims against
those who defraud it, and gave them an incentive to do so by assuring them a
substantial share of any recovery resulting from their efforts.83

80. CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY (Edward L.
Glasser & Claudie Goldin eds., 2006).
81. See JAMES HAW ET AL., STORMY PATRIOT: THE LIFE OF SAMUEL CHASE 105–08 (1980)
(discussing in detail Chase’s disclosure of a secret resolution of Congress to his business partners).
82. Qui tam is short for qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur translated
as “he who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.” See Vermont Agency
of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000). The history of the law is
recounted in JAMES B. HELMER, JR., FALSE CLAIMS ACT: WHISTLEBLOWER LITIGATION 29–61 (3d
ed., 2002). See also Mark Labaton, The Federal False Claims Act: A Primer for Lawyers Pursuing
Actions on Behalf of Whistle Blowers, ADVOCATE 1 (Mar. 2006) (reviewing the federal False Claims
Act and defining qui tam); Mark Labaton, Twenty Years Later, False Claims Amendments Keep
Working, DAILY J., Oct. 26, 2006, at 6, available at http://www.kreindler.com/kreindler_
publications.html (follow “read article” link under article title) (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) (reviewing the
effect of the federal False Claims Act twenty years after enactment of the 1986 amendments).
83. A useful account of the early legislation and its colonial antecedents is Note, The History and
Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81 (1972).

04__CARRINGTON.DOC

Autumn 2007]

3/14/2008 1:01:34 PM

LAW AND TRANSNATIONAL CORRUPTION

123

The early legislation was little used in the decades before the Civil War,
surely in part because the federal government in those decades was not
spending large sums exposed to diversion for private use. But because military
expenditures in time of war are especially vulnerable to corruption, the Civil
War appeared to bring an epidemic of public scandals rising to the cabinet level.
Secretary of War Simon Cameron was dismissed by President Lincoln for
paying his friends twice the going rate for 1,000 cavalry horses that turned out
to be afflicted with “every disease horse flesh is heir to.”84 Such scandals led to
the enactment in 1862 of the False Claims Act, then known as “Lincoln’s
Law.”85 That law required the offender guilty of defrauding the government to
pay double damages, half of which would be paid to the relator, that is, the
citizen who maintained the case on behalf of the United States. Thereafter,
numerous relators came forward to pursue claims against contractors who were
proven to have sold the army rifles without triggers, gunpowder diluted with
sand, or uniforms that could not endure a single rainfall. Perhaps their lawsuits
came to have some deterrent effect, elevating the integrity of government
contractors and the quality of the arms supplied to Union soldiers. It is certain
that they did restore some revenue to the Union treasury from those who had
raided it.
Yet the practice of bringing such suits again fell into disuse. There was
notorious corruption in the federal government of former General Ulysses
Grant,86 but none of those who were responsible were sued, either by a relator
or by the government. A civilian contractor who sold poisoned meat to the
Army as it invaded Cuba in 1898 was likewise never sued nor prosecuted by the
Department of Justice, notwithstanding the fact that the formaldehyde with
which they preserved the meat killed more American soldiers than did the army
of Spain.87
Similar but perhaps less deadly frauds were common during both World
Wars, but generally received scant attention from the inadequately staffed
Department of Justice. In 1942, “Lincoln’s Law” was momentarily revived. A
qui tam action was brought by a perceptive lawyer who learned of a fraud on
the government by reading his daily newspaper’s report of a criminal case
brought against the offender by the Department of Justice. He sued the
offender for damages and won,88 to the benefit of both himself and the federal
treasury. But the event led threatened government contractors to pressure
Congress for a 1943 revision of the law to prevent “parasitic” private
enforcement actions based on previously publicized information already

84. HENRY SCAMMELL, GIANTKILLERS: THE TEAM AND THE LAW THAT HELP WHISTLEBLOWERS RECOVER AMERICA’S STOLEN BILLIONS 37–38 (2004).
85. Act of March 2, 1863, 12 Stat. 696-699 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2000)).
86. JOSIAH BUNTING, III, ULYSSES S. GRANT 129–39 (2004).
87. SCAMMELL, supra note 84, at 40.
88. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
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available to the government.89 Qui tam actions again subsided. A legislative
committee led by Senator Harry Truman exposed many abuses and induced
repayment of billions of dollars from wartime contractors, but without imposing
any civil liability or criminal accountability on the individuals involved.90 And
entrepreneurs were otherwise substantially unconstrained from selling weapons
or parts of weapons that were useless or worse, at prices that bore no relation to
the costs of production.
The larcenous practices continued through wars in Korea and Viet Nam.
Industrial firms sold the United States aircraft with wings they knew to be too
short to be safe, radar systems that were nearsighted, all-terrain vehicles ready
to explode on contact, and countless other worthless weapons. It was perhaps
acute awareness of such problems that caused President Dwight Eisenhower in
his farewell address to caution the people of the United States against the greed
and ambition of the “military industrial complex.”91 It is said that many
American soldiers in Viet Nam were killed with munitions made by the
Vietnamese from American bombs that had failed to explode.92 The
Department of Defense employed officers to resist plunder by those with whom
it contracted, but they were often outnumbered and overborne by private
experts highly paid to confound the government and sell products of
disappointing quality at the highest possible price. The problem abides; in 2006,
the United States Coast Guard reported that it had spent billions on a worthless
fleet of new ships.93
During the Cold War, ever more elaborate weaponry was sold to the United
States at ever-rising prices. By the 1980s, most of the largest defense contractors
were under investigation for defrauding the Department of Defense (not to
mention scores of other federal programs buying goods or services). Four
(General Electric, GTE (later assimilated into Verizon), Rockwell, and Gould)
were convicted.94 The Department of Justice had more cases than it could
handle. Senator Chuck Grassley, a conservative Republican farmer from Iowa,
took a keen interest in the problem. The result was a revision of the False
Claims Act drafted by public-interest lawyers and the Department of Justice. It
was signed by President Reagan on the eve of the Congressional election,
despite desperate protests by the defense industry.95

89. Act of December 23, 1943, ch. 67, § 3491, Pub. L. No. 213, 57 Stat. 608 (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729–33 (1986)).
90. For an account of Truman’s efforts, see DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 270–88 (1992).
91. President Dwight Eisenhower, Farewell to the Nation (Jan. 17, 1961), available at
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/farewell.htm/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2007).
92. SCAMMELL, supra note 84, at 14. A case involving a misfiring of a weapon in Cambodia
reached the Supreme Court. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
93. Eric Lipton, Billions Later, Plan to Remake the Coast Guard Fleet Stumbles, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
9, 2006, at A1. See also Editorial, Ships That Don’t Dare to Sail, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2006, at A34.
94. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2–3 (1986).
95. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3739(d)(1)–(2) (2000)). A celebration of this legislation is found in SCAMMELL,
supra note 84. A similar provision rewarding whistle-blowers who reveal private fraud was enacted in
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This 1986 version of the False Claims Act provided for the recovery of treble
damages for defrauding the United States, with fifteen to twenty-five percent of
the recovery to be paid to the private plaintiff-relator. Proceedings under the
Act are not criminal proceedings, so proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” is not
required; a “preponderance of proof” will, if credited, suffice to support a
judgment against the defendant. Full use may be made of the civil procedural
right to compel disclosure of possible evidence96 and to compel nonparty
witnesses to supply their evidence as well.97 And much of the government’s files
are exposed to private investigation as a result of the Freedom of Information
Act.98 The Department of Justice is entitled to intervene and take control of the
proceeding, but even if it does, the case continues as a civil action and the
relator remains a party.99 And if the Department of Justice does not intervene,
the relator is entitled to maintain the action in the name of the United States.
Such a relator, if successful, is then entitled to receive at least twenty-five
percent of the treble damages proceeds, plus reimbursement for costs including
attorneys’ fees.100 And if the relator is unsuccessful in proving the case, there is
of course ordinarily no liability for the legal expenses of the defense.101 This
scheme serves to assure the availability of private legal counsel for plaintiffs
with credible claims based at least in part on some bit of personal knowledge.
The relator is also provided with rights safeguarding him or her from retaliation
by an employer.102
Retained is the provision enacted in 1942 that requires a plaintiff seeking
compensation as a whistle-blower to be an “original source” source of the
information on which the claim rests.103 In 2007, the Supreme Court held that
the relator is not entitled to compensation when the case is taken over by the
Department of Justice and won on a ground different from that initially
advanced by the relator.104
By 2005, almost 9,000 false-claim cases had been filed pursuant to the 1986
statute. A majority of these cases were initiated by whistle-blowing citizen-

the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)), also known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
96. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37.
97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
99. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (2000).
100. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2000).
101. For an account of the of this distinctive “American rule,” see John Leubsdorf, Toward A
History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recoveries, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 9 (Winter
1984).
102. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000).
103. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
104. Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397 (2007). Cf. United States ex rel.
Bly-Magee v. Premo, 470 F. 3d. 914 (9th Cir. 2006). Congress might reconsider that question, for it
weakens the incentives provided to whistle-blowers and thus diminishes the prospect that the proceeds
of false claims judgments will ease its budgetary constraints. That the government lawyer finds a factual
basis for the claim different from that advanced by the relator is hardly disproof of the merit of the
relator’s claim.
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relators; thirty-three whistle-blowers came forward in 1987 and by 2002 the
number had risen to 326.105 The number has continued to rise. Although
historically, the bulk of the false claims actions were directed at those who
provide goods or services to the military, other industries have become frequent
targets for qui tam claims. Now, four out of five current false-claims cases are
brought against health-care providers accused of overpricing goods or services
paid for by the Department of Health and Human Services.106
In 2006, Congress enacted a provision rewarding states for enacting similar
laws applicable especially to health care providers.107 And other applications
have evolved; for example, educational institutions are being sued to recover
the value of student loans made by the Department of Education and used for
tuition in programs that failed to meet the minimum standards of accreditation
organizations. Imaginably, a whistle-blower could represent the United States
to make a claim against a bank or other creditor who lent money to the United
States knowing that the funds would be used to finance corrupt practices, such
as buying goods or services at twice their market price, or to fund the
Governor’s Swiss bank account.
A charitable organization, Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund,
provides tips, information, and support to a variety of relators.108 It complains
that the Department of Justice does not invest sufficient resources in the
enforcement of the law, even failing to spend funds that have been appropriated
specifically for that purpose. It also complains that government contractors are
not providing their employees with information about the law so that they are
aware of opportunities to serve as a whistle-blowing relator.109
The False Claims Act is, of course, applicable to transactions between the
United States and foreign providers of goods or services, or perhaps to
government loans. The statute provides for personal service of process
anywhere in the world so long as it is in conformity with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.110 Subject only to the limits imposed by the constitutional
requirement of Due Process, jurisdiction over firms outside the United States is
established in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.111

105. SCAMMELL, supra note 84, at 304–05.
106. Marcia Coyle, High Court Vets False Claims Act, NAT’L L. J., Nov. 27, 2006, at 13.
107. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1398h). Section 6031 provides that the federal contribution to Medicare programs are to be
increased to ten percent for states enacting appropriate false claims laws applicable to health-care
providers. Section 6032 requires states to include provisions notifying health-care employees of their
right to become whistle-blowers.
108. See generally Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, Home Page, http://www.taf.org (last
visited Apr. 11, 2007).
109. Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, Press Release, Fighting Medicaid Fraud By Drug
Manufacturers (June 28, 2005), available at http://66.98.181.12/whistle39.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 4 provides for service anywhere in the world, in compliance with treaties where
available. E.g., Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in
Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 658 U.N.T.S. 163; 20 U.S.T. 361.
111. 31 U.S.C. § 3733(c)(2) (2000).
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Anyone in the world with enough contact with the federal government to
defraud it surely has sufficient contact to satisfy the requirements of Due
Process, and would thus be subject to personal jurisdiction in that court.
Discovery of evidence abroad is available and assisted by foreign governments,
or at least by those committed to the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters.112 A foreign party who
refuses to provide documents or other evidence upon demand is subject to an
adverse judgment on the merits of the dispute, it being reasonably inferred that
the evidence the party refuses to produce on request would prove the allegation
of the adversary.113 Presumably such a civil action can proceed even against a
foreign government under the “commercial exception” provision of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act.114 Whether the final judgment of a federal court
against a false-claims defendant would be effectively enforced abroad would,
however, be a question.115
Of the fifteen billion dollars recovered by the United States in the 9,000
false-claims cases pursued from 1987 to 2005, about two-thirds were recovered
in qui tam cases initiated by citizen-relators.116 In 2003, the United States
recovered eighty-five million dollars in qui tam cases that the Department of
Justice declined to pursue and left to the solitary efforts of relators and their
private counsel. The median recovery in such private qui tam cases was
$784,597, and the median relator’s share was $123,885. Substantial legal
treatises have been generated to record the many decisions interpreting the
Act.117
As one would expect, business and industry decry the development of the
False Claims Act as a scheme for rewarding self-seeking troublemakers,
unfaithful employees, and greedy tort lawyers. It is a development contrary to
the ambition of American Business to achieve “tort reform” by diminishing its
exposures to civil liability and thus its accountability for the harms it imposes on
others.
In 1993, Attorney General William Pelham Barr, with the blessing of
President George H. W. Bush, questioned the constitutionality of the 1986 law
as a violation of separation of powers because it interfered with the

112. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, July 27, 1970,
847 U.N.T.S. 231; 23 U.S.T. 2555.
113. Ins. Corp. of. Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 705–09 (1982).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000). Cf. Guevara v. Republic of Peru, 468 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2006).
115. Efforts to create a Hague Convention obligating nations to enforce one another’s judgments
failed. A major reason was the reluctance of other nations to enforce American judgments they deem
to be public-law enforcement, such as punitive-damages judgments. Louise Ellen Teitz, The Hague
Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party Autonomy and Providing an Alternative to Arbitration, 53
AM. J. COMP. L. 543, 549 (2006); Stephen B. Burbank, Federalism and Private International Law:
Implementing the Hague Choice of Court Convention in the United States, 2 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 287
(2006).
116. Marcia Coyle, High Court Vets False Claims Act, NAT’L L. J., Nov. 27, 2006, at 13.
117. E.g., JOEL M. ANDROPHY, FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND QUI TAM LITIGATION (2006);
JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS (3d ed. 2006).
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prosecutorial discretion of the Department of Justice.118 This argument struck at
the primary reason for the law, that is, public mistrust of prosecutors. All
prosecutors and government attorneys in the United States, even those with job
security as civil servants, are like the British prosecutor: subject to the oversight
of political officeholders. Most of these political officeholders were, or are,
dependent on the political and monetary support of businesses, especially those
businesses that deal with the government. Those firms are, with few exceptions,
major contributors to political campaigns and are major employers of lobbyists,
two practices that seem to have displaced bribery as the primary methods by
which capitalists profitably influence American government.119 As the Supreme
Court has steadily enlarged the First Amendment right to spend money to
influence political outcomes,120 the sums of money spent on political campaigns
have elevated beyond levels that could have been imagined even a few decades
ago.121 Prosecutors and other government lawyers do still commence
proceedings against businessmen who offend the law and cheat the government,
but they are inevitably constrained from doing so by political realities and their
limited office budgets. What Attorney General Barr sought to secure was the
discretion of government lawyers to look the other way when their friends,
supporters, and campaign contributors were suspected of resorting to improper
means of acquiring government contracts. Rejecting Attorney General Barr’s
argument, the Ninth Circuit upheld the law and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.122
Nevertheless, still keen in 2007 to disable the False Claims Act as enacted in
1986 are firms in the health-care industry that have been beset with fraud claims
in the last decade.123 Some did prevail in getting the Supreme Court to rule in
2000 that state hospitals cannot be exposed to liability under the statute for
overcharging Medicare because of their defense of sovereign immunity, but in
that case the Court also unreservedly acknowledged the constitutionality of the
Act, rejecting the earlier argument made by Attorney General Barr and his
supporters that it interfered with the discretion of the Executive Branch.124
Claims for the benefit of state governments arising from the same
transactions as those defrauding the federal government may be joined with a
qui tam action brought in the name of the United States.125 And by 2006, there

118. Constitutionality of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 13 Op. O.L.C. 249 (1989)
(preliminary print).
119. STIGLITZ, supra note 6, at 191.
120. For a summary and critique of this development, see Paul D. Carrington, Our Imperial First
Amendment, 34 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 1167 (2001).
121. For specific data, see the annual campaign finance reports of the Federal Election Commission.
122. United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1190
(1994).
123. See ANDROPHY, supra note 117, at 5-1 to 5-68 (2006).
124. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
125. 31 U.S.C. § 3732(b) (2000).
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were eighteen state enactments similar to the federal law.126 But three of those
states have restricted the laws to the health-care industry,127 presumably to
shield those who build highways or other public works from the enlarged threat
of liability for corrupt practices. Perhaps the distinction reflects greater trust in
highway contractors, or perhaps their greater influence on state legislatures.
Newly elected Governor Spitzer of New York favors qui tam legislation in his
state.128 And perhaps such laws might serve to modify the corrupt “way [things]
[a]re done” in Illinois, as presently reported.129
In December 2006, the idea of rewarding whistle-blowers was extended by
the United States to reward private enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code.
No longer will the federal government rely solely on the beleaguered and
understaffed Internal Revenue Service to detect unreported or underreported
income.130 Advocates foretell that this reform will enlarge federal tax revenue
by many billions of dollars a year,131 and perhaps enable the United States to
balance its budget at reduced tax rates. The optimism might be realistic if all
citizens are made fully aware of the entitlement they might receive upon
performance of the public duty to correct and deter tax cheating, which is surely
one of the most popular of the nation’s indoor sports.
The United Kingdom, Korea, and the Netherlands, and perhaps some other
nations, have enacted laws to encourage and protect whistle-blowers who alert
prosecutors to frauds on their governments.132 The resistance of businessmen to
such legislation tends to confirm the need for it, but the deterrent effect is not
easily measured. There is no question that business and industry in the United
States have incurred substantial legal costs in defending 10,000 civil actions
brought under the False Claims Act since 1986. Yet there can also be no doubt
that the federal treasury and its taxpayers have received a substantial benefit,
and that state governments are likely to receive one as well. For citizens who
dislike paying taxes, especially more taxes than identically situated tax cheaters,
claims and recoveries won by whistle-blowing relators are without question a
boon.

126. Christina O. Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical
Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 956, nn.47–77 (2007).
127. Louisiana, New Mexico, and Texas.
128. Press Release, Office of the New York State Attorney General, Spitzer Calls for Passage of
State False Claims Act (June 12, 2003), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/jun/
jun12a_03.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
129. Lynne Marek, Corruption Boom, NAT’L L. J., Dec. 11, 2006, at 1.
130. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, H.R. 6111, Pub. L. No. 109-432 (2006), 120 Stat. 2922.
131. Radio Broadcast, Marketplace, IRS Sweetens Reward for Whistle Blowers (Dec. 21, 2006),
available at http://www.marketplace.org/shows/2006/12/21/AM200612216.html (last visited Oct. 29,
2007).
132. GUNTER HEINE & THOMAS O. ROSE, PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BRIBERY: A COMPARISON OF
NATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES 81, 161–262, 311, 648 (2003) (discussing the
United Kingdom, Korea, and the Netherlands, respectively). See also id. at 230 (reporting that Japan
has the beginnings of a movement to enact legislation protecting whistle-blowers).
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To be sure, the False Claims Act is not without its critics. There is anxiety
about the frequency of false claims.133 But the data invoked in support of that
complaint is not convincing; the proportion of claims that prevail are reasonably
close to the average for civil claims. No doubt the best cases are taken over by
the Department of Justice, but there is no reason to believe that it has the
resources and energy to identify those winning cases without help of whistleblowers. And some cases declined by the Department are won by private
lawyers. There is, of course, a litigation cost borne by defendants, but it does
not appear to be materially greater in proportion than the costs associated with
most other endeavors of private law enforcers. There is no data by which the
deterrent effect of such law can be measured, but there is little reason to doubt
that a fair assessment of the deterrent effect should add to the billions
recovered from false claimants still other billions that the government would
have paid if those with whom it were dealing were confident that no one other
than the Department of Justice would notice and call attention to their
misdeeds.134
V
A COMPARISON: THE BYRD AMENDMENT
A cautionary note about the American model of law enforcement by private
plaintiffs is sounded by the law enacted by Congress in 2000 to encourage
whistle-blowing in regard to other illicit practices in international trade. The
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of that year,135 generally known as
the Byrd Amendment, was deeply troubling to those committed to free trade. It
offers an example of a whistle-blowing reward system not to be replicated in
addressing the problem of corruption of foreign governments.
The Byrd Amendment rewarded whistle-blowing firms complaining of
imports alleged to be sold to American buyers at prices below cost by making
them the beneficiaries of any tariff imposed and collected by United States
Customs in response to their complaints. Grievances lodged against the United
States with the World Trade Organization (WTO) in response to this legislation
were entirely justified. “Anti-dumping” law, although permitted by the WTO,136

133. See, e.g., Elletta S. Callahan & Terry M. Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives
for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 333–35 (1992); Joan H. Krause,
“Promises to Keep”: Health Care Providers and the Civil False Claims Act, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363
(2002); Broderick, supra note 126, at 964–80; Bryan Terry, Note, Private Attorneys General vs. “War
Profiteers”: Applying the False Claims Act to Private Security Contractors in Iraq, 30 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 809 (2007).
134. WILLIAM L. STRINGER, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD, THE 1986 FALSE CLAIMS ACT
AMENDMENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC IMPACT 35 (1996), estimates the return at $35–$70
billion over the first ten years that the Act was in force.
135. Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549.
136. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 183; 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994).
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is at best questionable policy.137 No business in the world regularly sells goods
below cost unless perhaps monopolization or the extermination of competitors
were a prize in view. The American law against dumping was originally enacted
as part of the antitrust law; it has allowed the Customs Office to impose tariffs
on allegedly dumped goods by assuming that the cost of making them was the
same everywhere; if the goods in question cannot be made in the most costly
place, say, Canada, for less than the import price, then they are being “dumped”
within the meaning of this highly questionable law. The real cost borne by the
manufacturer is irrelevant. The Byrd Amendment then directs that all the
proceeds of this protective tariff be distributed to the protected firms who “blew
the whistle” by calling the attention of the Customs Office to the fact that an
imported product could not be made in the most costly foreign place for the
price being paid by American purchasers. A domestic competitor who failed to
blow the whistle on the low price does not share in the largesse of Customs.
Hundreds of millions of dollars were collected annually by Customs in response
to such complaints and then distributed only to those who did blow their
whistle.
Byrd Amendment whistle-blowers, unlike those who enforce the False
Claims Act, bore no costs and took no risks. The federal government conducted
an administrative proceeding to hear accusations of dumping, without charge to
the complaining party. That proceeding was simple: the hearing officer merely
estimated the costs of manufacture likely to occur if the product were made in
the nation designated by the relator. It is perhaps fair to speak of this law as
corruption in reverse. Government expends effort to pay sums to American
firms that they have not earned in the marketplace. Might one even speak of
this as a reverse bribe? Is it not likely that some of what is distributed to such
whistle-blowers finds its way into campaign contributions for the politicians
who devised the scheme or who are responsible for enforcement beneficial to
their whistle-blowing patrons?
Eleven nations vigorously protested the Byrd Amendment to the World
Trade Organization; the WTO authorized them to retaliate against the United
States.138 Canada was the first to do so; it imposed sanctions on American
trade.139 And in 2006 Congress relented,140 although not immediately.
But the idea of private enforcement of international trade law may have
merit that the Byrd Amendment conceals. If the factual issue of dumping were
to be presented to a disinterested forum, and if the relator and his or her lawyer

137. For a brief account of the economics, see STIGLITZ, supra note 6, at 91–94; see also PHILIP
BENTLEY & AUBREY SILBERSTON, ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING ACTION: LIMITS
IMPOSED BY ECONOMIC AND LEGAL THEORY (2007); ANTI-DUMPING: GLOBAL ABUSE OF A TRADE
POLICY INSTRUMENT (Bibek Debroy & Debashis Chakraborty eds., 2007).
138. Paul Meller, W.T.O. Authorizes Trade Sanctions Against the United States, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
27, 2004, at C3.
139. Paul Meller & Ian Austen, Duties to Rise on Some Items from U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005,
at C6.
140. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
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were willing to risk incurring the expense of presenting the case, the scheme
might make sense. It might even be the best method of enforcing such laws,
assuming that anti-dumping laws serve a valid public purpose of preventing
monopolization. Its advantage would be that the rights of firms competing in
the marketplace would be less dependent on their amiable relations with
politicians and the government lawyers they employ.
VI
LINCOLN’S LAW FOR FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS?
Notwithstanding this cautionary tale, might the FCPA, in light of the frailty
of the international efforts to date, be amended to authorize qui tam
proceedings on behalf of foreign governments? Although the FCPA is only a
criminal law, it does, as noted above, open American courts to civil plaintiffs,
including foreign governments, seeking compensation for harms resulting from
tortious corrupt practices. A possible additional basis for jurisdiction in such
cases in the federal courts of the United States is provided by the Alien Tort
Act enacted in 1789141 by the same Congress that enacted the False Claims Act.
That act opened the courts of the United States to civil tort claims brought to
correct violations of international law wherever they occurred. The Supreme
Court has recently clarified the eighteenth-century law to assure that the
international law invoked by the plaintiff is truly embedded in a treaty, and not
in a principle of natural law invented by judges to condemn what they perceive
to have been a misdeed.142 Surely the ratifications of the many previously
enumerated treaties confirm (if the question was ever in doubt) that bribery is
now an international tort of the sort remedied by the old Alien Tort Act. Like
piracy on the high seas, it is forbidden by the laws of every government in the
world. And it was so in 1789, even if transnational bribery had not yet been
widely encountered or forbidden in the nations of the bribers.
All manner of human-rights claims have been brought to the United States
under the Alien Tort Act, but few if any commercial tort claims have been
brought.143 A pertinent example of the former type of claim is the case presently
pending in the federal court in Manhattan brought by Nigerian plaintiffs
claiming that the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company paid officers of the
Nigerian government to punish Nigerians demonstrating against environmental
harms allegedly caused by Royal Dutch, resulting in the death of plaintiff’s
decedent.144
141. 1 STAT. 73.
142. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (disclaiming federal jurisdiction under the
Act over a claim arising from alleged police misconduct not prohibited by federal law).
143. Alex Markels, Showdown for a Tool in Rights Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2003, § 3, at 11.
144. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386 (KMW) (HBP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68133 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2006) (order denying protective order); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
No. 96 Civ. 8386 (KMW) (HBP), 01 Civ. 1909 (KMW) (HBP) 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65601 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 12, 2006) (order denying defendants’ Rule 37 motion); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392
F. 3d 812 (5th Cir. 2004) (ruling on procedural issues and remanding to district court).
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A foreign government could presently invoke jurisdiction in American
courts under the existing laws in an action to recover any payments it may have
made for goods or services in excess of what it would have paid if the corruption
of its officials by the defendants had not occurred. There are thus a number of
governments that may have been negligent in not commencing such civil actions
in American courts. Doubtless a disincentive to such actions by foreign
governments is that their lawyers would need to produce evidence in an
American court challenging the integrity of their own fellow nationals. But at
least in times following a change of regime, that obstacle might be regarded as a
political incentive to proceed.
Congress could also, at least imaginably, make the False Claims Act process
available to foreign governments and their citizens. Foreign nationals could be
permitted to sue in the name of their governments that have been corrupted by
a defendant who is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court in which the
action is brought. Congress also could prescribe an award of damages
commensurate with the damages provisions of the False Claims Act in order to
provide individuals and their lawyers—as well as governments—with the
incentives needed to investigate apparent corrupt practices and to advance their
claims.
Perhaps citizens of Kazakhstan could thus be induced to proceed in the
name of their republic with a claim against American oil companies for the
damages resulting from the bribery of their president. Such a foreign subject or
citizen could be equipped with procedural rights equal to those conferred on
American citizens by American courts, procedural rights that are not generally
available in courts of most other nations. These include (1) the “American
Rule” that losers do not pay winners’ attorneys’ fees in the absence of specific
legislation to the contrary; (2) access to contingent-fee lawyers; (3) the right to
discover evidence in the United States and abroad; (4) trial by jury; (5) a
standard of proof requiring no more than a demonstration of probability of
guilt; and (6) the possibility of a class action when many firms or persons have
suffered harms as a result of one proven bribe. These are, as previously noted,
among the instruments by which much American public law is enforced by
private plaintiffs, and they could be made available to foreign plaintiffs
representing their governments.
There would be no reason to fear the financial cost to the United States
government of providing judicial services to protect weak foreign governments
in this way. The income-tax revenue generated by American lawyers
representing the parties in such cases would surely offset the costs incurred by
the federal courts. And the foreign whistle-blowers could, if need be, quite
reasonably be required to pay additional court costs to protect the federal
treasury from loss.
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There are, however, at least three limitations on the effectiveness of such a
solo effort by the United States to correct the international problem.145 One is
the limit of the long arm of American courts. Personal jurisdiction would be
lacking over many of the defendants who ought to be subject to suit if the law is
to be effective in discouraging transnational corruption everywhere.
Jurisdictional limits would obviously be no problem for suits against American
defendants, but would put out of reach of the deterrent effect all those foreign
firms not subject to the personal jurisdiction of American courts, that is, those
lacking the “minimum contacts” required by constitutional Due Process.
Whatever grievances American business interests might have voiced in
response to the enactment of the FCPA would be greatly magnified.
There is a possible partial solution to this problem. It is to make the
extended FCPA available only to citizens and governments of nations that have
enacted similar legislation requiring international firms with whom they do
business to consent to the jurisdiction of an American court in private actions
brought to enforce the international law against corrupt practices. Surely there
would be no rush of sovereign nations to seize the opportunity provided. And
any who came forward might be expected to encounter serious difficulty in
making favorable contracts with many foreign firms unwilling to expose
themselves to suit in the United States. Nevertheless, such an enactment by the
United States might be recognized as an additional and earnest effort to lend a
hand to weak governments beset by corruption, an effort more earnest than the
FCPA. It is also at least theoretically imaginable that the World Bank might
condition some of its loans on such local legislation in order to reduce the
likelihood that the proceeds of its loans are wasted by corrupt practices.
A second limitation on the effectiveness of the solo effort is the limited
ability of American courts to enforce judgments against defendants whose
assets are beyond the American reach. One might hope that foreign courts
would lend a hand in collecting the judgments rendered pursuant to such
legislation and against firms that are within the constitutional reach of
American courts, but experience suggests that this is unlikely unless perchance
a change could be made in the governing transnational law to commit foreign
courts to enforce judgments rendered in the United States. Recent experience
with efforts at The Hague to reach agreement about the enforcement of foreign
judgments lends scant encouragement to such a hope.146 A possible impediment
to agreement is a longstanding international tradition that the courts of one
nation do not enforce the public revenue laws of another,147 a tradition reflecting

145. For the speculations of Ruth Wedgwood on the similar problems presented by private
enforcement of laws against terrorism, see CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM, supra note 17, at
247–52.
146. See supra note 115.
147. See, e.g., Planche v. Fletcher (1779) 99 Eng. Rep. 164, 165; Her Majesty the Queen In re The
Province of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F. 2d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 1979).
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the sharp distinction between public and private law familiar to the legal
systems of many nations.
Is it possible that such an agreement on the enforcement of foreign
judgments could be more easily reached if it were limited to judgments arising
from civil actions brought to enforce the international law against bribery? If
the “developed nations” of OECD are serious about putting an end to the
corrupt practices that so disable governments in “developing nations,” then
such a revision of the present conventions on the enforcement of foreign
judgments might be possible. They might enable the victims of corruption to
choose any forum.
A problem to be confronted in such a negotiation of a revised OECD
convention on judgments is that American courts are the courts to be chosen by
most plaintiffs. Whereas the courts of other nations that have ratified the Civil
Convention of the Council of Europe would also be open to private
enforcement of the international law, and might thus also impose the risk of
civil liability on offenders who engage in bribery and on the firms that employ
them, they do not generally offer the same package of procedural rights
available to plaintiffs in American courts. As an eminent English Master of the
Rolls put it, “as a moth is drawn to the light,”148 plaintiffs are attracted to
American courts. The proposal would therefore be likely to elevate the
concerns of Europeans who resent the pretentiousness of American courts
sitting as “world courts,” as they are sometimes prone to do.149
A third limitation on the utility of such American law is the limited ability of
the American government to protect foreign whistle-blowers from retaliation to
the degree they are able to protect American whistle-blowers. Perhaps whistleblowers could be provided asylum under existing international laws. That
possibility might give too much incentive to citizens of failing states who would
acquire not only the proceeds of their suits against former employers, but also
assured access to a better lifestyle in a “developed” country.
We may conclude that the extension of the FCPA to provide for qui tam
proceedings on behalf of foreign governments has not arrived, at least until a
narrowly framed judgments convention has been negotiated to assure effective
enforcement in foreign courts of resulting judgments against firms who
consented to jurisdiction as a condition of doing business with the weak
government to be protected. Until some forum of this sort is provided, one is
entitled to be skeptical about the commitment of OECD nations to deter the
corruption of weak national governments.

148. Smith Kline & French Lab., Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 2 All E.R. 72, 74 (C.A.) (Lord Denning,
Master of the Rolls).
149. Ralf Michaels, US Courts as World Courts: The Avant-Garde of Globalization (unpublished
essay 2005) (on file with author).
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VII
A TRANSNATIONAL FORUM FOR PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT?
In any case, a solo American effort to address the problem is obviously far
less attractive than one engaging the support of the whole community of nations
having a stake in international trade and in the stability of weak governments.
Might an international court be devised to fill the need by being as hospitable as
American courts to plaintiffs seeking to impose civil liability on those who
corrupt foreign governments? Alas, effective world government remains a
distant vision, but modest steps in that direction are sometimes taken.150
For example, the International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) was created in 1965 in response to an initiative of the World
Bank.151 Its jurisdiction is presently limited to claims against member states, but
155 nations have agreed to enforce its awards. Perhaps the World Bank could
devise a similar institution to deal with the transnational corruption problem. It
has been suggested that the World Bank could refuse to fund government
contracts to be performed by firms identified as corrupt;152 a process for
identifying corrupt contractors might impose other consequences on the firms
identified. But it would face the necessity of securing ratification of the scheme
by the nations expected to enforce its awards.
Or possibly the International Chamber of Commerce might create a
comparable arbitral institution whose awards would also be enforceable
worldwide under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards.153 An obvious problem is that the Convention
providing for enforcement of international arbitration awards assumes that the
forum’s jurisdiction rests on the consent of the parties, a condition that would
be lacking in all international qui tam cases. Possibly, as suggested above in
regard to the prospect of jurisdiction in American courts, the consent problem
might be addressed by individual governments enacting laws making consent to
arbitration before the ICC corrupt practices panel a condition of all public
contracts, including contracts of employment.154

150. See Anne Marie Slaughter, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004), urging that transnational
governance may work where global does not. But see Kenneth Anderson, Book Review, Squaring the
Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1255 (2005) (reviewing Slaughter’s A NEW WORLD ORDER).
151. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (1965). For an account, see W. MICHAEL
REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION:
BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR (1992).
152. See, e.g., Sope Williams, The Debarment of Corrupt Contractors from World Bank-Financed
Contracts, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 277 (2007).
153. E.g., Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New
York Convention), opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1958); see also
9 U.S.C. §§ 201–08 (1970) (ratifying the Convention).
154. This might be seen as a fitting use of another American legal novelty, the mandatory
arbitration clause. For critical comment on that institution, see Paul D. Carrington & Paul Haagen,
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Another possible concern is that the present Convention on Foreign
Awards vests discretion in the enforcing court to refuse enforcement of awards
offending its notions of sound public policy.155 And there is no treaty requiring
courts around the world to enforce civil judgments that offend local laws. Firms
planning to engage in corrupt practices might therefore be able to find
sanctuary nations in which to keep assets out of the reach of plaintiffs seeking
to enforce their awards.
If the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the OECD, or the
International Chamber of Commerce were to provide an effective forum for the
private enforcement of corruption law, they would need to empower the
whistle-blowing relator and his or her lawyer representing a government to
conduct a factual investigation much as a public prosecutor might. American
rules of procedure bearing on discovery156 surely need not be incorporated, but
they serve to illustrate what would be needed to empower private counsel to
investigate and reveal corrupt conduct. Truly effective international law would
also foreclose government secrecy in the nations to be protected so that officials
and their files would be subject to judicial scrutiny.
Perhaps international lawmakers might also need to take another leaf from
the False Claims Act and provide for double or treble damages to be divided
among the relator, his or her counsel, and the victimized government. The class
action would also deserve consideration. Finally, the lawmakers would need to
consider means of protecting whistle-blowers by imposing further liability on
employers who might be tempted to retaliate against their disloyalty to the firm.
The possibility of a whistle-blower’s right to migrate would be appropriate in
some circumstances.
If such a forum were established to facilitate private enforcement of laws
prohibiting bribery, it could also be given jurisdiction to decide factual issues
arising in the application of the odious debt doctrine, thereby lending some
legitimacy to decisions appropriately refusing to honor corrupt debts. And,
imaginably, private citizens could be permitted to present odious debt claims on
behalf of their governments.
There seems to be no immediate prospect of the ICC or the World Bank or
the United Nations, or any other organization taking on the task of creating a
forum in which effective private enforcement of international corruption law
could occur. But maybe the time has arrived to begin consideration of the
possibilities. And others have noted the difficulty and the need for transnational
institutions to find means of gaining a measure of trust from the citizens on
whose behalf they presume to govern.157 If a court were to be created, the
American tradition is ripe for study.
Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331; Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation, The
“National Policy” of the Supreme Court, 3 NEVADA L. REV. 259 (2002).
155. Convention, supra note 153, at art. V(2)(b).
156. FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37, 45.
157. ROBERT A. DAHL, ON POLITICAL EQUALITY 87–92 (2007).
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VIII
CONCLUSION
Perhaps those institutions here invited to enact legislation or to ratify a
treaty establishing the means for effective private enforcement of international
laws forbidding corrupt practices might take comfort from the knowledge that
the qui tam action proposed has an ancient and honorable history. Such
legislation is rooted in recognition of the frailties of government, and the limits
of what can be asked of government lawyers in a fragmented social order. The
world has long known that when developing nations are forced to rely wholly
on their public prosecutors to impose criminal punishment on their fellow
nationals and their partners in crime, we can expect corrupt practices to
flourish. This is especially true in those developing nations blessed with natural
resources that can be stripped for the benefit of firms, and for the politicians
able to extract bribes from such firms. This reality is now widely acknowledged,
but the responses of developed nations have not been adequate to address it.
Shocking though the thought is, what the world may need and what effective
globalization of the marketplace requires, are thousands of plaintiffs’ lawyers
(yes, just the American sort so despised by Business) who are motivated and
empowered to investigate the bribery of officials of weak governments and
present their evidence to a forum that is in turn invulnerable to bribery or
intimidation.

